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Abstract
This afternoon - and it’s nearly evening - I would like us to try to rethink industrial policy. I
think it makes no sense to speak of industrial policy and competition policy as distinct, one from
the other, let alone as antagonistic policies. I would rather define industrial policy as one which
frames the structural conditions necessary to ensure economic success in a globalizing economy.
I therefore have no qualms in saying that competition policy should form a central plank in any
industrial policy. As a member of the European Commission, I will focus my comments on the in-
terconnect between industrial and competition policy in the European Union. But these issues are
not just relevant for Europe. Our challenges are not so different from those facing other economies
in today’s world. I will first explain why embracing open markets and renouncing protectionism,
or what might be characterized as old-fashioned industrial policy, is not only desirable, but imper-
ative. I will then go on to set out some essential ingredients of a modern industrial policy, at least
as I see it, and explain why competition policy, in the widest sense, if you allow me, should play a
central role in shaping this.
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Neelie Kroes*
Thank you very much for inviting me to address you today.
It is an honor; it is a pleasure; and I am delighted to be in your
midst. The theme of today's debate, the relation between indus-
trial policy and competition law and policy, could not be more
topical.
Industrial policy and competition policy: For Europeans,
Mr. Chairman, just putting these two notions in one sentence
still tends to conjure up a great ideological divide, a divide be-
tween Colbertian "dirigistes" and economic libertarians on the
one hand-a faith in the ability of governments to successfully
build, direct and protect the supply side of the economy'-and a
belief on the other hand that markets should be subject only to
rules to guarantee a level playing field, but that markets are oth-
erwise best left to their own devices.2
This ideological divide has always been something of a cari-
cature, but it has lasted because there is some truth underlying
it. As a result, to put it bluntly, industrial policy has been rather
bad-mouthed by the advocates of competition policy.
This afternoon-and it's nearly evening-I would like us to
try to rethink industrial policy. I think it makes no sense to
speak of industrial policy and competition policy as distinct, one
from the other, let alone as antagonistic policies. I would rather
define industrial policy as one which frames the structural condi-
* Commissioner for Competition, European Commission, Brussels.
1. See Jim Chen, The Decline of the Nation State and its Effect on Constitutional and
International Economic Law: Contribution: Fugitives and Agrarians in a World Without Fron-
tiers, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1031, 1031 n.1 (1996) (quotingJean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-
1683) as saying, "There is nothing great without the state" ("Rien de grand sans l'dtat")).
2. See Brenda Cossman, Contesting Conseroatisms, Family Feuds, and the Privatization of
Dependency, 13 Am. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 415, 438 (2005) ("Libertarianism's project
is to reduce the role of the state by promoting private choice. "). Cossman explains that libertari-
anism derives from classic liberalism, which prizes individual liberty thriving on "the
economic liberty of a free market, and the political liberty of a minimal state." Id. at
433.
1401
1402 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 30:1401
tions necessary to ensure economic success in a globalizing econ-
omy. I therefore have no qualms in saying that competition pol-
icy should form a central plank in any industrial policy.
As a member of the European Commission, I will focus my
comments on the interconnect between industrial and competi-
tion policy in the European Union. But these issues are not just
relevant for Europe. Our challenges are not so different from
those facing other economies in today's world. I will first ex-
plain why embracing open markets and renouncing protection-
ism, or what might be characterized as old-fashioned industrial
policy, is not only desirable, but imperative. I will then go on to
set out some essential ingredients of a modern industrial policy,
at least as I see it, and explain why competition policy, in the
widest sense, if you allow me, should play a central role in shap-
ing this.
The proliferation and integration of markets worldwide pro-
vide unparalleled opportunity for economic development and
prosperity. Removing barriers to trade and competition opens
up new markets for the goods and services we all produce. It
also provides new opportunities for investing capital overseas
and for attracting investment into our own economies. Eco-
nomic growth is not a zero-sum game. The creation of jobs in
one part of the world does not imply long-term job losses else-
where. Economic growth, both inside and outside domestic or
regional markets, stimulates the demand for the products and
services we produce, thereby generating a virtuous circle of
growth and investment.'
The good news, ladies and gentlemen, is that European in-
dustry has clearly understood the opportunities that are out
there. In a way, globalization is nothing new for Europe. The
European Union is, in historical terms, a radical experiment in
the creation of open markets, and its record in generating
wealth and a better standard of living in Europe speaks for it-
3. SeeJoaquin Almunia, European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Pol-
icy, Address at the 9th Annual CFO European Summit, Globalizing Europe: An Inter-
nal Market for the 21st Century (Mar. 14, 2007), available at http://www.europa.eu/
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/] 45&format=HTML&aged=0&
language=EN&guiLanguage=EN (assessing the benefits of the European Union's
("EU") open economic model and finding that, in 2006, EU GDP growth was at 2.9
percent due to increases in domestic demand, investment, and net exports; unemploy-
ment levels fell to 7.6 percent; and growth trends were expected to continue).
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self.' The removal of barriers to the free movement of goods,
services, capital, and labor has required many economic adjust-
ments over the past few decades; but few now question that this
has been worthwhile.' Every Member State has the feeling and
has the knowledge that it is an excellent route we are going on.
The single market is a unique success story and very much a real-
ity for business.
In this context, I am not at all surprised by the growth in the
number of cross-border mergers.6 If anything, I'm pleased. I'm
really pleased. It shows that industries in our internal market are
able to restructure as they see fit, including through changes in
corporate ownership, to meet global challenges.
In Europe, the merger wave is particularly marked in sectors
which have recently been open to competition or which are go-
ing through the process of liberalization. Previously national
companies are becoming, in reality, European or even global
ones. Concerning what was said before during your panel dis-
cussion, I'm not interested in the nationality of the partners of a
merger; and I'm not interested in the size of the partners. I'm
interested in whether it conforms to the rules and regulations
4. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 2, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 ("The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a com-
mon market and an economic and monetary union . . . to promote throughout the
Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sustaina-
ble and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high degree of conver-
gence of economic performance, a high level of employment and of social protection,
the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohe-
sion and solidarity among Member States."); see also EUROPEAN COMMISSION DIRECTOR-
ATE-GENERAL FOR PRESS AND COMMUNICATION, KEY FACTS AND FIGURES ABOUT THE EURO-
PEAN UNION (2004), available at www.europa.eu.int/comm/publications/ (stating that:
"Over half a century, the Union has raised its citizens' standard of living to unprece-
dented levels. It has created a frontier-free single market and a single currency, the
euro. It is a major economic power and the world leader in development aid.").
5. But see Robin Niblett, Europe Inside Out, WASH. Q., Winter 2006, at 41, 44-45
(2005) (arguing that the current EU economic model is deficient and that integration
is failing to help Member States remain competitive); Irene Kyriakopoulos, After Expan-
sion: Europe toward Dis-Union?, MEDITERRANEAN Q., Winter 2004, at 17, 22, 32 (2004)
(arguing that although European integration has succeeded in improving standards of
living and wealth, the EU will become dangerously unstable if certain problems, such as
increasing unemployment, debt crises, and low economic growth, are not effectively
addressed); Is the EU Good for Economic Health?, BBC NEWS, Mar. 23, 2007, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/647051 3.stm (stating that EU States, especially
those that founded the EEC, are currently plagued by "sluggish economic growth and
high rates of unemployment").
6. See Xavier Vives, Airbus and the Damage Done by Economic Patriotism, FIN. TIMES
(London), Mar. 2, 2007 (noting the rise of European cross-border mergers).
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that we all have underlined in the Merger Regulation.'
In 1997, over fifty percent of the revenues of Europe's larg-
est companies were generated within their home markets-that
is to say, in the countries where they were headquartered., By
2005, only six years later, that figure fell to less than forty per-
cent.9 This development is all the more welcome given that
cross-border mergers, and notably those in sectors previously
characterized by the presence of large national incumbents,
tend to be more likely to enhance competition than mergers be-
tween national players in the same sectors.
Most of these cross-border mergers have gone ahead with-
out any interference from national governments, but in some
recent cases direct or indirect steps have been taken by national
European governments or authorities to frustrate the takeover of
important industrial concerns based in those Member States.
You all read about them.
Last year, there were two widely published cases in which
the Bank of Italy sought to limit the ambitions of non-Italian
banks to take over their Italian counterparts.1 0 Since then, we
have seen a number of other examples of more or less direct
interference. I have heard a lot about the strategic importance
of the yogurt sector, but I won't milk that point.
By the way, regarding the discussion of whether it's taking
too long when something is rotten in the State, I think that we
also have to take into account that in those cases, quite often,
companies are taking their advantage and are not in line with
what we should appreciate, that we could stick to our line and to
our policy. So don't blame only Europe and Brussels and the
competition authorities, but also blame the business world itself.
I have some information about that.
7. Council Regulation No. 139/2004, OJ. L 24/1 (2004).
8. See Un Rapport Critique la Defense des Champions Nationaux, LE MONDE (Paris), July
4, 2006 (citing a 2005 study finding that in 1997, the national market of Europe's 100
largest companies accounted for half of sales).
9. Id. (reporting that by 2005, the national market of Europe's 100 largest compa-
nies had been reduced to 36.9 percent).
10. See Xavier Vives, Barriers Need to be Lifted for an Integrated Market, FIN. TIMES
(London), Sept. 15, 2006 (stating that when Spain's BBVA and the Netherlands' ABN-
Amro attempted to take over the Italian banks BNL and Antonveneta, respectively, the
Bank of Italy's governor opposed the deal); Buy, buy, buy, ECONOMIST (London), Feb.
10, 2007 (noting that, following accusations of improper conduct in protecting the Ital-
ian banks from these takeover bids, the governor of the Bank of Italy resigned in 2005).
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But more recently, we have had to express our concern
about the conditions imposed by the Spanish energy regulator in
relation to German energy company E.On's bid for the Spanish
giant, Endesa. "
The rhetoric is always the same: Economic patriotism, or
the need to retain national ownership of strategic assets. Then
sometimes you are surprised about what all is in the word "strate-
gic." But this is outdated. The language and the mindset are
those of yesterday's people, not of these who have the guts to
look forward with ambitious realism.
I would not overstate the significance of the development I
have just described, but I am concerned, to be open to you. As
an economist, I am concerned that these actions will prove ill-
judged in the long term. As a European Commissioner, I am
concerned that they are contrary to the spirit and the letter of
the laws underpinning the European Union. That is why the
European Commission has taken action where needed: First,
under the single market rules contained in the Treaty of Rome,
which safeguards the free movement of capital and the right of
establishment; 2 and second, under a provision of the EC
Merger Regulation which only allows national governments to
intervene against mergers approved by the Commission if such
an intervention is compatible with Community Law.' 3
11. See EU Says Received Spain's Response to Concerns Over E. ON/Endesa, AFX INT'L
Focus, Mar. 16, 2007 (mentioning European Community ("EC") concerns in relation
to receipt of Spain's response); see also Sally Bogle, Endesa Mulls Lifting Restriction on Gas
Natural's Bid, Deadline Passes for Spain's Response to EC, GLOBAL INSIGHT, Oct. 26, 2006;
Andrew Bulkeley, E.ON Closes in on Endesa, DAILY DEAL, Sept. 15, 2006 (reporting that
European regulators had written to Spain regarding their concerns); Bruselas Advierte
Del Caos Que Provocaria un Pacto Bilateral Sobre la Opa de Eon [Brussels Concerned About
Bilateral Agreement Between Spanish and German Governments], FIN. TIMES (abstracted from
El Pais article originally authored by Andreu Misse), Sept. 9, 2006 (stating that EC has
expressed concerns).
12. See Council Regulation No. 139/2004, art. 1(2), O.J. L 24/1, at 1 (2004); see
also Global News Wire, Expediente de Bruselas a Italia por la Fusion Avertis-Autostrade [Brus-
sels Begins Proceedings Against Italy], FIN. TIMES (abstracted from EXPANSION), Nov. 13,
2006 (reporting the initiation of infringement proceedings "on the grounds that [the
concession] represents an unjustified restriction to the free movement of capital");
Adrian Michaels & Mark Mulligan, Rome Tests the Patience of Abertis A UTOSTRADE Merger,
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006 (discussing commissioners' reservations about Italian degree
with regard to Autostrade merger and its restriction of free movement of capital); Euro-
pean Commission Suing Spain Over E.ON Bid Conditions, DATAMONITOR NEWS WIRE, Oct.
19, 2006 (reporting on the violation of the Merger Requirements).
13. See Counsel Regulation No. 139/2004, arts. 18-19, O.J. L 24/1, at 3 (2004).
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I can assure you that we will not hesitate to enforce these
rules objectively, wherever that is appropriate, under the control
of our Community courts. Why? Because a failure to embrace
market integration within Europe or economic globalization-
"Fortress Europe," if you like-is not sustainable over the longer
term. The bitter experience of history has demonstrated that
engineering the creation or protection of national champions,
yielding to temptation for governments to pick winners, is not
the way to succeed in the global economy.
There may be short-term benefits to shareholders or em-
ployees who are given a stay of execution. But, again, experi-
ence has also shown that even some of the short-term benefits
from protecting industry can be illusory. Firms not facing com-
petitive pressures may have an incentive to reduce output and to
cutjobs. Consumers and taxpayers are likely to pay the price for
what, in the longer term, risks resulting in a downward spiral of
decreasing competitiveness. In short, the answer to the chal-
lenges faced by industry in today's globalizing economy is not to
seek to shield industry from the forces of competition, but to put
in place the conditions which will allow industry to flourish in an
increasingly competitive environment.
Ladies and gentlemen, it is time to put old-fashioned indus-
trial protectionism to bed and, instead, to develop a modern,
proactive industrial policy which embraces change and paves the
way for our future competitiveness. It goes without saying that, if
the European Union is to derive the full benefits of globaliza-
tion, our industry needs to be able to compete in global markets.
An effective industrial policy is one which is designed to ensure
that the conditions are in place for industry to prosper in a
global economy and for citizens to enjoy the rewards of such
prosperity.
The governments of all twenty-five EU Member States have
signed up with the European Commission to this vision of a
modern industrial policy in committing and recommitting to the
Lisbon Agenda, a partnership for delivering long-term growth
and jobs and the competitiveness of the European economy. 4
14. See LISBON EUROPEAN COUNCIL, PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS, Mar. 23-24, 2000,
available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cmsData/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-rl.en0.
hun; see also Achilles Skordas, Is Europe an "Aging Power" with Global Vision? A Tale on
Constitutionalism and Restoration, 12 COLUM.J. EUR. L. 241, 278-80 (2005-06)(discussing
Lisbon Agenda).
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What do I mean by a modern industrial policy? I mean a
policy which addresses the structural shortcomings of the Euro-
pean economy, a policy which equips firms to compete effec-
tively in the global economy, a policy which builds on our com-
parative advantages. Concretely, this means shaping a policy
which allows European industry to specialize in what it does best,
not only adapting to technological changes, but really driving
them. This policy must prioritize investment in research and de-
velopment, so facilitating the ability of European industry to
constantly innovate. It must put resources into education, into
training and retraining, so as to equip our labor force with skills
that match up to our ambitions. It must facilitate investments in
the constant upgrading of the infrastructure. I am talking about
transport, communication, financial, etc., which are the lifelines
of efficient commerce. Last, but certainly not least, this policy
must ensure that unnecessary red tape is cut so that the regula-
tory environment in Europe is more conducive to doing busi-
ness.
Such a broadly based and enlightened industrial policy will
not only enable European companies to compete more effec-
tively in the global market, it will also make Europe a more at-
tractive place in which to invest.
Which brings me to competition policy: What place should
competition policy occupy in a modern industrial policy of the
kind I just described? By stimulating efficiency in production
and innovation and allocation of resources, competition in the
provision of products and services ensures sustainable economic
growth, employment, and economic welfare generally. As the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") has put it, "competition has pervasive and long-lasting
effects on economic performance by affecting actors' incentive
structure, by encouraging their innovative activities and by se-
lecting more efficient ones from less efficient ones." 5
Indeed, there is considerable empirical evidence of a clear
and strong link between competition and productivity growth
and, hence, of an important link between competition and com-
15. See Sanghoon Ahn, Competition, Innovation and Productivity Growth: A Review of
Theory and Evidence 6 (OECD Econ. Dep't Working Paper No. 317) (2002).
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petitiveness.' 6 Competition policy which above all else is de-
signed to ensure the maintenance of competitive markets is,
therefore, central to an industrial policy aimed at enhancing the
competitiveness of industry.
The European Union has a unique combination of competi-
tion policy instruments at its disposal. Each contributes to the
pursuit of what are ultimately industrial policy goals, in the
broadest sense. Let's take a look at how they contribute con-
cretely to the realization of a modern industrial policy.
The basic antitrust rules, Articles 81 and 82, outlaw collu-
sion and abuse of market power. 7 The challenge for the Com-
mission in applying these rules is to prioritize its enforcement
resources, to focus on remedying the most serious impediments
to the functioning of markets. Targeted enforcement of this
kind, centered on sectors which are key to competitiveness and
behaviors which produce the most harmful economic effects,
helps to deliver clear benefits for European industry.
In our many dealings with Microsoft, for example, central to
the Commission's rationale for intervention has been the impor-
tance of preserving the incentives for firms to innovate.' In this
16. See id. at 16-19 (discussing empirical data and conclusions regarding the con-
nection between competition and productivity).
17. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
arts. 81-82, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. C 325/33, at 64-65 (2002) [hereinafter EC Treaty]; see
also Patrick S. Ryan, European Competition Law, Joint Dominance, and the Wireless Oligopoly
Problem, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 355, 361 (2005) (stating that collusion is required under
Article 81); Maurits Dolmans, Standards for Standards, 26 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 163, 190
(2002) (discussing the requirement of collusion for EC antitrust causes of action);
Damien Geradin, Competition Between Rules and Rules of Competition: A Legal and Economic
Analysis of the Proposed Modernization of the Enforcement of EC Competitive Law, 9 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 1, 8 (2002) (explaining Articles 81 and 82); Valentine Korah, Intellectual Property
Law in the Context of Competition Law: 'Consent' in Relation to Curbs of Parallel Trade in
Europe, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 972, 975 (2002) (mentioning collusion requirement
under EC Treaty); Koen Lenaerts & Ignance Maselis, European Community Competition
Law: Procedural Rights and Issues in the Enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1615, 1615 (2001)(discussing articles 81 and 82).
18. See Microsoft Corp. v. Commission of the European Communities, Case T-201/
04 R, [2004] E.C.R. 11-04463, I 24, 106 (discussing Commission's rationale to create
incentives to innovate); see also Christina Ahlborn et al., The Logic & Limits of the "Excep-
tional Circumstances Test" in Magill and IMS Health, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1109, 1127
(2005) (discussing the balancing test between incentives of the dominant firm to inno-
vate and the level of innovation of the entire industry); Ian S. Forrester, Article 82: Reme-
dies in Search of Theories, 28 FORDHAM IN ''L L.J. 919, 950 (2005) (mentioning the balanc-
ing test and weighing Microsoft's incentives against the industry incentives); Donna M.
Gitter, Strong Medicine for Competition Ills: The Judgment of the European Court of Justice in
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regard, an artificial interoperability advantage for a super-domi-
nant player actually dampens the market's incentives to inno-
vate, since companies know that, however good their products
are, they cannot compete on the merits of these products. Simi-
larly, tying to a super-dominant platform can send signals which
limit available venture capital and deter innovation in adjacent
product markets, by large and small companies alike.
Our enforcement policy has therefore been guided by these
principles, and our actions are designed to maximize the level of
innovation in the market. This will result in benefits in terms of
industrial competitiveness and will ultimately, I believe, translate
into more consumer choice and lower prices.
Another example is in our enforcement activity against car-
tels, which I have made a priority of my mandate as commis-
sioner. Defeating cartels lowers prices for consumers, individu-
als as well as business customers. We are using a mixture of tast-
ier carrots and tougher sticks. Cartels are hard to detect, so we
are improving our leniency program, in particular, by looking at
a one-stop shop solution to make it easier for applicants to come
forward. On the stick side, our new fines guidelines are de-
signed to deliver an effective deterrence and are likely to result
in an overall increase in the level of fines, particularly where
there are aggravating circumstances such as repeat offenses. 9
Over the last couple of decades, the Commission has also
spearheaded the liberalization of certain industrial sectors that
were previously either closed altogether to competition or char-
acterized by pervasive restrictions or impediments, whether pub-
lic or private, to competition. Opening these sectors, notably
through the use of Article 86 of the Treaty, has created a virtu-
ous circle of increased growth and employment, lower costs for
industry, and a better choice for consumers. The most obvious
examples are the telecoms and airline sectors, in both of which
prices have come down significantly, and the range of services
the IMS Health Action and its Implications for Microsoft Corporation, 15 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 153, 190 (2004) (examining the incentive balancing test).
19. See Guidelines On the Method of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant to Article
23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, O.J. C 210/2 (2006); see also Patricia Carmona
Botana, Prevention and Deterrence of Collusive Behavior: The Role of Leniency Programs, 13
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 47, 62-63 (2006-07) (discussing the three main novelties of new guide-
lines and how they represent "toughening" of prior policy). See generally Vanessa Turner
et al., New EU Antitrust Fines Policy: How Much Will a Violation Now Cost?, 21 ANTITRUSTr
ABA 53 (2006) (assessing the new guidelines and their effects).
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has increased significantly, as a result of the EU liberalization,
with direct benefits for European consumers and for European
industry.20 Reduced import costs and a better choice of services
have had clear cost-benefits across the European industry.
As a result of liberalization, there has therefore been eco-
nomic growth and increased employment, notjust in the liberal-
ized sectors themselves but across all industrial sectors which
consume these essential inputs.
In the telecom sector, liberalization has led to the emer-
gence of a multitude of competitors for fixed-line and mobile
voice services, as well as the Internet connectors. Research by
the OECD indicates that mobile subscriber growth rates are posi-
tively correlated with the number of competing networks in a
market.21 So competition not only gives more customers access
to mobile services, faster and at lower prices, but it also grows
existing markets and creates new ones, provides market entry op-
portunities for new firms and lowers the input costs of telecom-
munication services.
20. See Commission Directive No. 90/388, O.J. L 1922/1 (1990), amended by O.J. L
256/49 (1995), amended by OJ. L 20/59 (1996), amended &y O.J. L 74/13 (1996)(regu-
lating the competition in markets for telecommunications services with 1995 amend-
ment abolishing the restrictions on use of cable television networks, the first 1996
amendment affecting mobile and personal communications, and second 1996 amend-
ment affecting implementation of full competition in telecommunications markets);
Commission Directive No. 88/301, O.J. L 131/73 (1988) (regulating competition in
markets in telecommunications terminal equipment); Commission Imposition of Dec.
10, 2004. O.J. C 306/3 (2004) (imposition of public service obligations on airline ser-
vices within Italy); Commission of the European Communities, Communication from
Commission to European Parliament, COM(04)7 Final (Jan. 9, 2004) (concerning com-
mon position of Council on adoption of Regulation of European Parliament and of
Council on protection against subsidization and unfair pricing practices in supply of
airline services from countries not members of the European Community); Commis-
sion of European Communities, Amended Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of Council, COM(03) 228 Final (May 7, 2003) (concerning protection
against subsidization and unfair practices causing injury to Community air carriers in
supply of airline services from countries not members of European Community); see
also Lars Gorton, Air Transport and EC Competition Law, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 602
(1998) (discussing EC action in airline sector, specifically relating to competition); Mark
Thatcher, The EU Commission and National Governments as Partners: EC Regulatory Expan-
sion in Telecommunications 1979-2000, 8J. OF EUROPEAN PUB. POL'V 558 (2001)(explain-
ing history of Commission regulation of telecommunications industry from 1979 to
2000).
21. See COMMITTEE FOR INFORMATION, COMPUTER, AND COMMUNICATIONS POLICY,
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD REFLECTIONS
ON THE BENEFITS OF MOBILE CELLULAR TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE COMPETI-
TION, OCDE/GD(96)42, 1996.
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So I think it's evident from the European Union's experi-
ence that a carefully planned and executed liberalization policy
is a central piece of comprehensive modern industrial policy.
Of course, I am not naive. I have already mentioned how
some in Europe have been and continue to be less keen to put
liberalization into practice when they perceive it as bad news for
their own national players. But that won't stop me from continu-
ing to explain why the facts prove that it is the best route for
European industry and for the consumer. I think the arguments
also carry the same weight outside Europe, and I will not hesitate
to export them.
Last but by no means least, I would like to address an aspect
of EU competition policy which is crucial to the modern indus-
trial policy which the European Union is pursuing: The control
of State subsidies to industry. My top priority as Competition
Commissioner has been a comprehensive reform of our State
aid rules. Our objective is to help Member States to spend only
as much of the taxpayers' money on subsidies as is absolutely
necessary and to target that expenditure as effectively as possi-
ble. Our motto is, less aid and better targeted State aid.
We look first to the markets to deliver, and only where there
are clear gaps does State aid play a role. It's true that there can
be a gap. Properly targeted State aid can serve to complement
structural polices of the kind I mentioned earlier, by tackling
genuine market failures to enable firms and workers to adapt to
a rapidly changing economic environment. For example, state
aid which is designed to support training or the employability of
the workforce can fall into this category. New rules are being
developed for aid where this really is needed to promote the
emergence of young innovative enterprises. In this respect, we
have learned a lot from the U.S. Small Business Act.
But in all of this, one thing has to be made crystal clear:
grant too much State aid and, quite simply, the private money,
which is the real long-term driver of our economy, will be
crowded out.
To finish, let me add that while far-reaching State aid con-
trol, beyond WTO discipline, may be unique to the European
Union, I do believe that other economies would benefit from
seeking greater discipline for the manner in which the State sup-
ports industry. I don't think it's just in Europe that we believe in
FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
markets. I know for a fact that it is not just in Europe that State
money is sometimes wasted on lame ducks. If you believe in the
market, then you should trust in the market first and foremost.
We should all respect WTO discipline, but, if possible, we should
actually all go beyond it.
I have said it before, and I shall say it again: Competition
policy is not an end to itself, not even for a Competition Com-
missioner. It is a means to reach a goal. I am not interested in
having competition for the sake of it. I am not interested in tak-
ing ideological stances concerning policy agendas. My priority is
policy measures that are sound, that are pragmatic and really
work in real life-modern solutions which match up to the chal-
lenges of today's marketplace.
With this in mind, Mr. Chairman, I have been trying for al-
most two years to focus European competition policy on what
really matters for the competitiveness of European industry, for
the benefits of European consumers. This is why I have strength-
ened our fight against cartels; this is why I have undertaken a
wide-ranging revision of our State aid policy; this is why I have
launched competition sector inquiries in sectors that I regard as
crucial to the overall competitiveness of our industry; and this is
why I have launched, here at Fordham a year ago,2 2 an ambitious
review of our enforcement policy against unilateral conduct. I
think the results are starting to speak for themselves.
Is this an industrial policy? I suppose it is. Call it what you
like, but, personally, I think it is the only modern and realistic
policy approach to today's environment, which is why, whether I
am on the Forbes list or not, I still continue to be an ambassador
for competition in Europe and throughout the world.
22. See Neelie Kroes, Tackling Exclusionary Practices to Avoid Exploitation of Market
Power: Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Policy Review of Article 82, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
593 (2006).
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